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sometimes impossible to determine the price behavior of consumers and, therefore, it is impossible to allocate 
deviations from an optimum without the analysis of preferences of consumers and the production technology.  
In addition, we will consider the goods characteristics of that consumer know only after their acquisition 
("experience goods"). The main questions connected with such goods, are the following: are there incentives 
for producers to ensure the quality and such variables, as the price and the advertising pass any (indirect) 
information on it? The main incentive for quality assurance is possibility of repetitive consumer purchases 
which induces firms to maintain a level of quality in order to avoid damage to their reputation and to lose 
possibility of sales in future. 
2. Method 
As is known, it is difficult to find satisfactory definition of the concept of an industry or market. On the one 
hand, the two goods are almost never perfect substitutes (in the sense that it is indifferent to all consumers 
which of goods to buy if they have the same price). Goods usually differ in some characteristics. On the other 
hand, the group of goods in economy ("branch") is always in interaction for some extent with other goods; 
pricing on the goods which aren't included to this branch, influences on demand for goods in this branch not 
only through income effects, but also through substitution effects. The concept of branch is an idealization or a 
marginal case. 
There is a question how to describe the differences between goods of one branch. This question, in 
particular, was under consideration of Hotelling, Chamberlin, Lancaster. As shown in J.Tirole's work the goods 
can be described as a set of characteristics: quality, location, time, availability, existence of information by 
consumers on existence of goods and its quality, etc. Each consumer classifies goods by a set of variables. 
Having all potential characteristics of the goods, it is possible to get its complete description. As in 
empirical, and theoretical work researchers are focusing on a small subset of characteristics and on special (and 
if it is possible, reasonable) description of preferences. There are three types of the commonly used situations. 
In vertically differentiated space of goods all consumers agree on the most preferable set of characteristics, 
and generally and the ordering of preferences. Quality – a typical example to that. Most agree that the higher 
quality is more preferable; for example, "Volvo" car is more preferable than "Hyundai". Nevertheless, the most 
part of consumers can continue to buy the last. The income of consumers, cars prices and their service define a 
final choice of consumers. In the same way smaller and more powerful computer is more preferable than bigger 
and less powerful. At the equal prices natural grading characteristics on space is important. 
Goods defined by characteristics, which consumers prefer. Preferences of consumers can be non-uniform in 
relation to characteristics. When considering horizontal and vertical differentiation’s models it supposed that 
consumers buy only one product, in other words, they do not get extra utility from consumption of various 
goods. On the contrary, it can be assumed that consumers can consume more goods; moreover, the only thing 
that all of them are interested in goods is its characteristics. For example, assume that the consumer is 
interested in protein and vitamins load in foodstuff. If unit of foodstuff 1 contains two units of a protein and 
one unit of vitamins, unit of foodstuff 2 – one unit of a protein and two units of vitamins and unit of foodstuff 3 
–one unit of each, the consumer is indifferent in a choice between one unit of foodstuff 1 and 2 and three units 
of foodstuff 3. In other words, the consumer, finally, are only interested in characteristics of set of goods, i.e. 
only in the sum of characteristics of set of goods. For the first time this approach was used by Lancaster. 
The approach "goods – characteristics" makes sense in some cases. For example, buying electro bulbs 
consumers primarily interested in the total number of hours during which bulbs will work. Ability to 
summarize characteristics is the key to this approach. In some situations this approach is less useful, 
particularly in the indivisibility of consumption, as in the cases of vertical and horizontal differentiation 
considered above. Then the model of Lancaster has to be corrected. 
As Rosen notes, "two cars six foots long each aren't equivalent to one car of twelve foots in length as they 
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cannot be managed at the same time" (or "because that violins two, they don't become a Stradivarius violin"). 
Rosen departs from the concept of Lancaster, assuming divisibility exist. Consequently, "the hedonic prices", 
making a total cost of a set of characteristics, cannot be linear on quantitative values of characteristics even in 
the conditions of the perfect competition. Thus, it is impossible to calculate the goods price, by summarizing 
quantitative values of characteristics weighed at the prices. Individual quantitative values of these 
characteristics have influence on prices. 
In our opinion, this last case means that volumes of supply and demand cannot be considered only 
depending on the price. The variety of characteristics of the goods demands consideration of the specified 
categories of the market in the space of all their characteristics, including, at the same time price and quality. 
As noted above, approach in terms of goods, instead of characteristics is very common (for example, the 
main form of Lancaster’s approach assumes linear functional forms). However for annexes to the theory of the 
organization of the industry it can have some disadvantages. Absence of the characteristics description 
according that firms compete, sometimes gives a limited intuitive view about truth of preferences. As well as in 
case with utility function, approach can be very specific. The last considers all differentiated goods 
symmetrically. When the firm introduces a new product, it doesn't choose level of its differentiation to other 
products. 
It differs from approaches of horizontal and vertical differentiation, and also from approach "goods – 
characteristics" that there is no concept of "remoteness", or "vicinity" in relation to other goods. In particular, 
this approach is not so suitable for the description of limited space. Generally, the economists who are engaged 
in the theory of industrial organization consider that the new product doesn't compete so closely with all and 
each product.  
3. Result 
Let's consider various ways selection of goods. Begin with selecting the quality level (vertical 
characteristics) of the producer. Then, consider the closely related question of whether the producer realizes too 
much or few products (from the public point of view). 
Assume that the single product is produced and the producer chooses for it two material numbers: price ɪ 
and quality g. Let ɪ = P(Q, g) – inverse function of demand, i.e. price that creates demand on Q commodity 
units with g level of quality. Quality is desirable in that measure in what P increases on g. Let’s ɋ(Q, g) – the 
general costs of production of Q commodity units with g level of quality. It is natural to assume that the general 
expenses ɋ will increase on quality g. 
Competitive firm choose the quality level to maximize a difference between gross consumer surplus and 
production expenses. Considering quantity and quality as the variables, the competitive firm maximizes public 
welfare. 
( ) ),Q(,),Q(
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³ −=         (1) 
where integrand expression P (x, g) – is the gross consumer surplus, described by a demand curve with this 
level of quality g. 
The first order conditions, i.e. equality to the zero of first derivatives at the price and quality are following: 
P (Q, g) = Cq(Q, g)          (2) 
and 
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where interlinear indexes denote private derivatives on volume Q and quality g. Equation (2) is a well-known 
equality between price and marginal costs. Equation (3) follows from the choice of the level of quality. It 
shows that the partial derivative of gross surplus on quality is equal to the marginal costs of good production 
with this level of quality. To understand the economic meaning of this equation, suppose that the demand 
function based on a large number of consumers with unit demand, and range them in the order of decreasing 
willingness to pay. Then P (x, g) – is the price at which to the consumer x is indifferent to buy or do not buy 
one commodity unit with a level of quality g. 
Thus, price Pg(x, g) is equal to willingness of the consumer x to pay (in monetary terms) for one additional 
unit of quality. On the other hand, price Pg(x, g) – is a marginal valuation of quality of the marginal user at 
price Pg(x, g). It follows thence limit gross surplus is equal to a goods release Q and an average marginal 
valuation of quality for all market: ( ) QdxgxP
Q
g /,
0
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These results will be used further to determine the growth of public welfare from improvement of level of 
goods quality. The reasons of growth of goods quality are various. In particular, this may be the capital 
accumulation, successful application of scientific and technical progress results, development of new 
perspective technologies, using of more qualitative resources, etc. 
Let's allow g2 = g1 + ǻg – a new level of quality, ǻg> 0 – a positive increment of a quality level 
However the increment of a quality level leads to the goods price increase, corresponding to a quality 
increment. As for quantity demanded, it can increase, remain invariable or decrease depending on type of 
goods. 
Therefore on the basis of equation (1) we can get results of an increment of public welfare on increase of 
goods quality level and quantity of output in the following form:  
dW(Q, g) = Wg (Q, g) dg or ǻW(Q, g) = Wg (Q, g) ǻg ,  
where Wg (Q, g) – – limit public welfare for one additional unit of quality level at a constant or variable 
quantity of output. 
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where Pg(x,g) – marginal valuation of quality and the marginal costs of providing an additional unit of quality 
level. 
Pg(x, g)
 
– is the price equal to willingness of consumer x to pay (in monetary terms) for one additional unit 
of quality, on the other hand the price Pg(x, g)
 
– is a marginal valuation of quality of marginal user at the price 
Pg(x, g). It follows that a welfare gain on quality is equal to goods of quality dg increment on a difference 
between an average marginal quality evaluation and marginal cost of goods production of this quality level. 
To determine the maximum welfare on output quantity and quality will consider a condition of the second 
order. Value of welfare function W(Q, g) in a point M0(Q0, g0) is called as a maximum if it is the greatest in 
comparison with its value in all rather close values of point Ɇ0. The welfare function depends from two 
variables–production volume and goods quality and can have a maximum only in the points lying in function 
area of welfare. There all its partial derivatives of the first order are equal to zero of the second order condition 
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too. 
The second order condition is determined as: 
02 >−==Δ BAC
CB
BA
, when Ⱥ<0 and ɋ<0       (5) 
where Ⱥ=WQQ(Q0, g0), ɋ= Wgg(Q0, g0), B= WQg(Q0, g0), 
respectively the second derivatives on the volume and quality and joint derivatives on the volume and quality. 
Ⱥ=WQQ(Q0, g0) = ɊQ(Q, g) – CQQ(Q, g) < 0 
ɋ= Wgg(Q0, g0) = 0),(),(
0
<−³
Q
gggg gQCdxgQP  
B= WQg(Q0, g0) = Pg(x, g) – CQg(Q, g) 
Similarly we can consider growth of social welfare on condition of change of production volume: 
dW (Q, g) = Wq (Q, g) dQ = [P (Q, g) –Cq(Q, g)]dQ 
where Wq(Q, g)
 
– social marginal welfare for one additional unit of quantity at an initial or invariable level of 
goods quality. 
Pg (x, g) is positive as the partial derivative of increasing function of the price from quality. 
Improving of the quality level on additional unit is stimulated by consumer demand for quality goods. In 
addition, the goods price on quality grows quicker, than the cost of expenses for one additional unit of quality. 
It is a condition of a quality level increase. Otherwise increase of a quality goods level is senseless. 
At the same time positive marginal quality assessment shows the direction of social welfare growth, i.e. we 
find positive link between growth of goods quality and as result social welfare growth. 
Thus, we obtain the new function of social welfare that establishes direct link between social welfare and a 
level of quality weal. It represents the sum of benefits (surplus) of consumers and producers of this quality weal 
in the market. 
The producer is interested in the profit, not in the social surplus. Thus, he/she maximizes profit 
ɉm(Q, g)= Q P(Q, g) – C(Q, g).  
It leads to conditions of the first order 
P(Q, g) + QPQ(Q, g)=CQ(Q, g)         (6) 
and 
QPg(Q, g) = Cg(Q, g).          (7) 
The equation (4) is known to us as equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost that represents 
optimal pricing of the producer. The equation (5) determines the optimal level of quality for this output Q. It 
claims that marginal revenue linked with increase of a quality level on unit, is equal to the marginal cost of 
goods production of this quality level. 
 The difference between the equations (2) and (4) is known; the producer is interested in influence of 
production volume on the price while competitive firms are not interested. It is more interesting to compare the 
equations (3) and (5) in this case. Interest of the producer in an average marginal quality evaluation is replaced 
with his interest in "marginal" evaluation to Pg(Q, g), where the first word " marginal" belongs to the consumer, 
and the second–to a level of quality, i.e. the marginal consumer to a marginal level of quality. It is easy to 
understand, as the producer considers influence of quality improvement on all consumers; the monopolist 
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considers influence of quality improvement on the marginal consumer. If monopolist raises the level of quality 
on ǻg, he raises the price of Pg (Q, g) ǻg, and thus keep the demand on the same level (i. e., keep the same 
level of marginal consumer utility). However such prices rising can extend on all premarginal consumers that 
generates the additional income QPg(Q,g) ¨g. 
 As a result: a incentive for quality assurance is related to the marginal willingness of marginal consumer to 
pay for quality in a case with the producer. 
The quality of some goods (for example, clothes) the consumer can check even before their purchasing. In 
other cases, quality can be known when the goods are bought, for example, taste of canned food or quality of 
food in a restaurant. There are also goods qualitative aspects of that (such as the fluoride content in toothpaste, 
timeliness of medical intervention) can be checked rarely, even after their consumption. These three types of 
goods can be called as search goods, experience goods and credence goods. Certainly, most of the goods cannot 
be divided on such a simple classification because they have features that are checked before their purchasing, 
after it or never checked. 
The main question for search goods is selection of goods (their quality, variety). For experience goods the 
main question consists in information. How consumers learn about goods quality? What incentives forcing 
firms to provide quality? We will see that repeated purchases allow the consumer to exercise some goods 
quality control. For credence goods the information is more current question. For the obvious reasons 
government intervention here is often necessary. 
In a broad sense search goods include "goods on a guarantee". There are no needs always check quality 
before purchasing. If the producer guarantees to the consumer full compensation in case of discrepancy of 
quality to the declared characteristics of goods, it ceases being a problem; the customer doesn't care if goods 
quality corresponds to the declared by the producer. It is necessary to be convinced, has the producer an 
incentive to give a full guarantee. It can be shown that in the continued possibilities to estimate quality 
(characteristics) of goods and if deviations in characteristics can be attributed to the producer completely, the 
last actually has a desire to give a full guarantee. At intuitive level it is supposed that in case of a partial 
guarantee of the producer consumers would have a suspicion and they would draw the right conclusion: the 
producer is afraid to give a full guarantee for the reason that his goods is defective. Therefore, the consumer 
would have to pay compensation. Thus, the partial guarantee is a signal of low quality. On the other hand, the 
system of a full guarantee induces the producer to internalize any wrong perceptions by consumers and 
eliminates information problems. Thus, information problem about quality can be eliminated by improved 
system of guarantees. 
Nevertheless, in many interesting real situations the system of guarantees is missing or incomplete. If quality 
means durability, the goods need to be consumed so that the consumer will learn his real quality; if as usual it 
happens, the last characteristic of goods depends on a way of consumption and original quality of such goods, 
the consumer will have a problem of moral hazard: the consumer has no incentive to care of goods in the 
presence of a guarantee of full compensation in case of its failure (i.e. the failing of goods doesn't demand 
expenses from the consumer). The evident way in this case would make a consumer internalize some of the 
expenses linked with his behavior, and provide him a partial guarantee. As motive of partial guarantees 
providing can be reasons of adverse selection. For the obvious reasons goods with full guarantee involve 
irresponsible users or consumers with "high level of risk" whereas the goods with a partial guarantee (cheaper), 
are bought by consumers for whom probability to get benefit from a guarantee less. 
The moral hazard and adverse selection, certainly, explain many limitations of the guarantee system. For 
example, it is unlikely that the producer would provide a guarantee on those parts of car that depend of the 
driving habits of the owner or his behavior during maintenance (for example, tires). But there are also other 
reasons when experience goods have the partial guarantee. Definition of a quality level can be impossible or 
too expensive for judicial authorities whereas the consumer still observing it. On the one hand, the perception 
of quality can be subjective (do colors on TV screen “meet expectations” of consumer after a year of its 
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working?). On the other hand, the  unintended expenses can be incommensurable to a problem (the consumer 
doesn't make a claim to the producer at breakage of a low-priced goods). When the quality description, offered 
by the producer, includes many properties and/or considerable uncertainty of last characteristics of a sample of 
made goods, the guarantee can demand the high unintended expenses and it complicates consumer evaluation. 
The producer who sells experience goods to one-time buyers and cannot provide any guarantee, nor 
prosecuted for defective goods, has intensive stimulus to decrease quality (if quality is linked with heavy 
expenses) to the lowest level as market price cannot react to unobservable quality. The minimum level of 
quality can be legalized by standard or by level when consumers can present convincing evidence of 
insufficient quality assurance. Thus, there is a "moral hazard" from the producer. 
The problem of moral hazard explains, for example, why food at restaurants in some establishments is not 
what might be: the short duration of consumption in these places doesn't allow reputation to be important. 
Generally a level of goods quality that the producer chose or goods that bought once mostly will be low. 
Let's consider the next simple model†. All consumers are identical. They have preferences U = șg – ɪ, if 
they buy a goods of the producer at the price ɪ, with level of quality g, otherwise U = 0. The producer chooses 
the price ɪ and level of quality g. Specific costs of production make Cg for level of quality g. The profit of the 
producer is ɪ – Cg if he sells goods with level of quality g at the price ɪ and it is equal to zero if he doesn't sell 
goods. Assume that consumers don't get information about quality before purchase. Obviously, there cannot be 
a balance when the monopolist sells goods and provides its high quality. The monopolist would save Ci – ɫɨ, by 
reducing quality that wouldn't reduce demand. If ɫɨ = 0, balance in this model is reached at g = 0, and 
consequently, ɪ = 0. If ɫɨ> 0, the market disappears as consumers aren't ready to pay for goods with a level of 
quality zero and therefore the producer cannot cover the own expenses. 
In this simple example we assumed that consumers cannot learn quality of goods before its purchase. 
However in certain interesting cases some consumers get information about quality of goods before purchasing. 
For example, the consumers carry out technical tests or develop the skills that help them to estimate quality by 
quick look at goods. The consumers watch television programs about qualitative and operational features of 
goods or read specialized publications. Other opportunity is that consumers come to the market consistently 
therefore at a given time some of them have information about the level of quality, and others - no. 
4. Conclusions 
The informed consumers have a positive impact on uninformed consumers. Being more exacting, they raise 
the level of quality of a producer goods. Therefore, firstly, the producer will provide high quality only at 
sufficiently high price. If the price is high, the producer is afraid to lose a high margin of profit on the informed 
consumers so low quality is less attractive. In this sense, high prices can be a signal of high quality goods for 
the uninformed consumers if there are also informed consumers (and producers can’t offer various quality 
levels to consumers of different groups). 
Secondly, the more informed consumers, the higher probability that our condition will be executed. It is 
natural, because informed consumers don't allow the monopolist to reduce a level of quality. Thus, we conclude 
that increasing of the informed consumers promotes efficiency increase. 
The last conclusion is offered as an argument for government intervention. Awareness of consumers 
depends on their relative expenses of information obtaining. Making a decision about information obtaining 
necessity, the consumer considers only own private expenses and benefits. The consumer doesn't take into 
account fact that, being more informed, he makes the producer (or allows him) to provide high quality. Thus, it 
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is necessary to stimulate increase of awareness of consumers more than their optimal level. 
One of such incentives could be subsidizing of a specialized television programs and magazines issue. 
Imperfect information is the basis of the quality problem. At the single relations the informed consumers 
have a positive external impact on the uninformed consumers. The government in this case can improve 
welfare, by subsidizing information obtaining. 
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